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We examine how information technology (IT) influences asset ownership through its 
impact on firms’ and agents’ capabilities.  In particular, we propose that when IT is a 
substitute for agents’ industry-specific human capital, IT adoption leads to increased 
vertical integration.  We test this prediction using micro data on vehicle ownership patterns 
from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were 
first adopted by taxicab firms.  The empirical tests exploit exogenous variation in local 
market conditions, to identify the impact of dispatching technology on firm asset 
ownership.  The results show that firms increase the proportion of taxicabs owned by 12% 
when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems.  The findings suggest that firms 
increasingly vertically integrate when they acquire resources that substitute for their 
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Information technology (IT) is profoundly changing how firms are organized, as falling 
communication costs alter the efficiency of internal firm governance relative to market 
exchange.  Because efficiency and firm organization are inextricably linked (Coase 
1937), it is, therefore, of great importance to develop a deeper understanding of how the 
efficiency enhancing features of IT influences firm organization.  This paper explores the 
relationship between IT and the economic organization of exchange by focusing on how 
IT adoption substitutes firm capabilities for agents’ capabilities.  In doing so, the paper 
takes a first step toward integrating the insights of the literature on organizational 
economics with the literature on organizational capabilities in the context of information 
technology adoption.   
This paper proposes conditions under which IT investments reduce the relative 
value of agents’ investments in industry-specific human capital, leading to increased 
vertical integration.  We focus, in particular, on how IT influences firm asset ownership 
when IT is a substitute for agents’ industry-specific knowledge.  Our key assumption 
builds on one of the central predictions of transaction cost and property rights theories:  
asset owners make non-contractible investments in industry-specific human capital that 
non-owners are unwilling to make (Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986).   
We use the assumption that ownership and industry-specific human capital are 
correlated to characterize the ex ante equilibrium into which IT is introduced.  We, then, 
show how communication cost reducing features of IT shift returns to firm asset 
ownership, relative to agent asset ownership, leading to a new equilibrium where firms 
are increasingly vertically integrated.  Specifically, we propose that when information 
from centralized management is a substitute for industry-specific knowledge, providing 
additional centralized information is worth less to asset owners who have made industry-
specific investments in knowledge than to non-owner agents.  Under these conditions, 
the adoption of information technologies that lower centralized communication costs, 
leads to increased firm ownership of assets by decreasing returns to agent owners, 
relative to non-owner agents.   
We test this prediction using micro data on taxicab firms’ vehicle ownership 
patterns from the Economic Census during a period, (1992-1997), when new 
computerized dispatching systems, consisting of a centralized computer and a network 
of mobile onboard computers, substantially lowered the cost of communicating 
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information between individual taxicab drivers and firm managers.  The empirical context 
is particularly appealing as it allows us to disentangle the impact of IT on capabilities 
from its effect on monitoring or incentives because taxicab drivers’ remain full residual 
claimants before and after the IT shock.  Furthermore, the fact that local markets are 
distinct and heterogeneous allows us to exploit exogenous variation in local market 
conditions to identify the impact of adoption of computerized dispatching systems on firm 
asset ownership.   
The results show that IT adoption leads to increased vertical integration when IT 
substitutes for agents’ industry-specific knowledge.  Specifically, when firms adopt 
computerized dispatching systems, they increase the proportion of taxicabs owned by 
the firm by 12%, relative to non-adopters.  The findings suggest that by substituting firm 
capabilities for agents’ industry-specific knowledge, IT adoption increases the returns to 
low-skill agents relative to high-skill agents, leading to increased vertical integration. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
Understanding patterns of asset ownership has been a central issue in organizational 
economics since Coase’s (1937) conjecture that firms should coordinate transactions 
internally only when doing so is more efficient than coordinating those activities through 
markets.  Organizational theorists refined Coase’s (1937) insight by highlighting the 
importance of specific investments and contractual incompleteness, in the presence of 
potential  ex post opportunism, in determining the boundaries of the firm (Williamson 
1975, 1985; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978).  Grossman and Hart’s (1986) property 
rights theory extended earlier work on organizational economics by developing a model 
where asset ownership increases the likelihood that an agent will make specific 
investments when doing so improves the ex ante efficiency of exchange.  While 
assumptions over the salience of ex post opportunism versus ex ante efficiency in 
contracting can generate different predictions, both theories predict that asset owners 
are more likely than non-owners to make specific investments that improve the 
productivity of the asset they own.
   Thus, it follows from the logic of organizational 
economics that by making specific investments agents generate valuable resources or 
skills (or capabilities), and by doing so the asset becomes more productive and the 
agent becomes “indispensible to (the) asset” (Hart and Moore 1990, p.1133). 
In this paper, we examine the role of an important class of specific investments 
that make assets more efficient and agents indispensible to the assets:  industry-specific 
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human capital, which includes knowledge of industrial routines and processes, that is 
specific to a single industry.  Thus, we emphasize how capabilities arise from agents’ 
investments in industry-specific human capital.  Building on the premise that asset 
owners’ investments in industry-specific human capital create capabilities, we 
incorporate the idea that centralized information from the firm can be a substitute for an 
individual’s industry-specific knowledge to develop a theory of organizational response 
to the adoption of information technology.   
By focusing on the impact of IT on the value of the firm’s agents’ knowledge, we 
build on and extend a literature on IT and worker capabilities.  This literature is often 
called the skill-biased technical change literature because of the stylized finding that IT 
adoption leads to increasing worker productivity amongst the most highly skilled workers 
(Krueger 1993; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000).  However, a nascent literature 
shows that IT can have the opposite effect—rather than being complementary to worker 
skills, IT adoption can also substitute for worker skills, leading to a lower skilled, or de-
skilled, workforce ex post (Autor and Dom 2009).  We develop the de-skilling result 
further, in the context of organizational economics and organizational capabilities, by 
showing that the boundary of the firm shifts away from market exchange toward vertical 
integration when IT substitutes for agents’ industry-specific human capital. 
This research also contributes to an important branch of the organizational 
economics literature, which examines the impact of IT adoption on the boundaries of the 
firm.  Early theoretical work on information technology and asset ownership applied 
property rights theory to information assets, positing that increased alienability of 
information, or degree to which information can be transferred efficiently, should lead to 
a shift in asset ownership away from owners of inalienable information (Brynjolfsson 
1994).  The theory developed in this paper builds on Brynjolfsson (1994) by considering 
an IT shock that increases the alienability of information as a substitute for an agent-
owners (inalienable) industry-specific human capital.  However, in contrast to 
Brynjolfsson’s (1994) emphasis on the incentive enhancing features of alienable 
information, we isolate, theoretically and empirically, a capabilities-based mechanism 
underlying the shift in asset ownership due to IT adoption.  
By focusing on incentive features of IT, previous research on IT and firm 
boundaries has made great strides in applying organizational economics to questions of 
IT adoption and asset ownership.  However, the early research does not consider how IT 
influences firm organization through its impact on capabilities.  Yet, it is clear that IT 
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systems expand the firm’s ability to disseminate information to its agents, which might 
also influence the comparative governance costs of firm versus market exchange 
(Demsetz 1988).  Indeed, the knowledge-based view of the firm suggests that the 
boundaries of the firm are sensitive to the efficiency with which the firm codifies and 
disseminates production information (Kogut and Zander 1992; Conner and Prahalad 
1996).  While the knowledge-based view of the firm offers a capabilities-based theory of 
firm boundaries, the precise mechanisms through which improved information flow might 
lead to changes in firm organization are less clear.  We build on the knowledge-based 
view of the firm by integrating it with insights from the literature on IT and worker 
capabilities and with the organizational economics literature on organizational response 
to IT adoption, to develop a deeper understanding of how IT influences asset ownership 
through its impact on firms’ and agents’ capabilities. 
We propose a simple theory, where IT reduces the relative returns to 
investments in industry-specific human capital, leading to increased firm asset 
ownership.  Because IT allows the firm to communicate valuable production information 
at lower cost to its agents, it raises the productivity of workers who operated without the 
production information previously.  However, communicating new information to workers 
who already possessed the required production knowledge has no impact on their 
productivity.  Thus, the communication cost reducing feature of IT can reduce the 
relative returns to knowledge.  When knowledge and asset ownership are jointly 
determined and positively correlated prior to the adoption of IT, as is standard in 
organizational economics models, the firm’s ability to substitute centralized information 
for agent knowledge leads directly to increased firm asset ownership. 
  To make the theory concrete, consider a setting where there are two types of 
agents, asset owners and non-owners, both of whom work for a firm that manages their 
productive efforts with a legacy technology that disseminates centralized production 
information to agents.  Asset-owners possess capabilities that arise from their prior 
investments in industry-specific human capital, which increases their productivity and 
their wages relative to non-owners.  By contrast, non-owners do not possess industry-
specific knowledge, and, therefore, rely more heavily on centralized information provided 
by the firm to direct their productive efforts.   
From the baseline ex ante distribution of asset ownership in an industry, as 
described above, we examine how asset ownership changes ex post when there is an 
information technology shock that increases low-skill agents’ productivity by more than 
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high-skill agents’.  We propose a simple and direct outcome of IT adoption:  the 
composition of the firm’s workforce will shift toward lower-skill workers, inducing a 
corresponding shift toward firm asset ownership.  Consider, for example, an information 
technology shock that facilitates the dissemination of centralized information that 
substitutes for industry-specific knowledge.  Since centralized information is a substitute 
for agent knowledge, IT adoption increases the value of low-skilled labor relative to high-
skilled labor, leading the marginal agent-owner to sell their assets to the firm.  IT 
adoption essentially renders the marginal agent-owner’s industry-specific knowledge 
obsolete—the agent ceases to be indispensible to the asset.  When agent asset 
ownership ceases to be efficient, the marginal agent-owner sells their assets to the firm.  
Thus, in general, when information technology increases non-owners’ productivity by 
more than owners’, IT adoption will lead to increased vertical integration.   
We formalize the relationship between asset ownership changes and technology 
adoption that increases the productivity of non-owners by more than agent-owners in the 
Appendix, showing that if the relative productivity shock is large enough IT adoption 
leads to vertical integration.  An important special case of when a shock is “large 
enough” occurs when IT is a substitute for industry-specific human capital.  Therefore, 
we state the theory as a formal hypothesis when industry-specific knowledge and 
information technology are substitutes. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: When information technology is a substitute for 
industry-specific human capital, information technology adoption leads to 
an increase in firm asset ownership. 
 
Our theory roots capabilities in organizational economics and links changes in 
patterns of asset ownership to a capabilities shock.  Linking organizational economics 
and capabilities allows us to make a clear prediction about the conditions under which 
information technology leads to increased firm asset ownership.   Thus, we predict a 
dynamic organizational response to IT adoption, given an initial equilibrium in the asset 
ownership market, through the impact of IT on capabilities.   
The key assumptions underlying the prediction that information technology 
adoption leads to increased firm asset ownership are (1) that asset owners make 
efficiency enhancing specific investments in industry-specific knowledge ex ante and (2) 
that information technology is a substitute for industry-specific knowledge.  The literature 
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on organizational economics predicts that the first assumption should hold whenever (a) 
industry-specific knowledge is complementary to a physical asset and (b) contracts over 
the bundle of these complementary assets are incomplete.  Where assumptions (a) and 
(b) hold, industry-specific knowledge forms the basis for individual-level capabilities and 
assumption (1) is satisfied.   
The validity of the second assumption, concerning the substitutability of 
information technology for industry-specific knowledge, is likely to vary across industries 
and with the specific features of the information technology adopted.  In particular, IT will 
substitute for industry-specific knowledge when managerial direction and agent 
knowledge are substitutes and IT lowers communication costs from the corporate center.  
Thus, the relationship between IT adoption and changes in the boundary of the firm 
depend crucially on the nature of managerial versus agent capabilities and the IT 
resource acquired.   
Bloom, Garicano, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) make a related point, showing 
how communication and information processing features of information technology 
influence firm organization differently.  Indeed, in other contexts where information 
processing features of IT are of first order importance, as opposed to the communication 
features we emphasize, IT adoption could lead to less vertical integration.  For example, 
in Argyres’s (1999) study of the design of the B-2 bomber, he shows that by reducing 
information processing costs and standardizing communication, IT improves 
coordination and reduces asset specificity facilitating vertically disintegrated project 
organization.  Similarly, Baker and Hubbard (2004) find that the adoption on-board 
computers (OBC) in trucking fleets ameliorates external contracting problems, pushing 
the boundary of the firm toward driver-ownership of vehicles.  We describe why our 
empirical context fits assumption (2) below.
 
 
3. Institutional Context 
Taxicab fleets began using computers during the 1970s, but automated data dispatch 
systems did not arrive until the early 1980s.  By the early 1990s, firms began adopting 
computerized dispatching systems, comprised of a central computer that coordinates 
vehicles and communicates information and vehicle-level on-board computers.  Basic 
computerized dispatching systems, called “partially automated” systems, require drivers 
to send a signal to the central computer, indicating their location by entering a zone 
number into a simple onboard computer, and human dispatchers to announce ride 
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allocations, using a separate communication system (usually a radio).  More advanced 
“fully automated” systems deploy in-car devices with two-way communication capability, 
allowing the back-end optimization algorithm to communicate directly with onboard 
computers in taxicabs.  These systems also automatically monitor pickup and drop-off 
actions, such as turning the meter on and off.  During the sample period, fixed costs 
associated with fully automated systems were around $750,000, while per vehicle costs 
were about $1,000, including the onboard computer (Gilbert, Nalevanko and Stone, 
1993).
1  The most advanced computerized dispatching systems are GPS-based, which 
eliminate the need for drivers to enter zone numbers and track a vehicle’s exact location 
at all times.  GPS-based systems are substantially more expensive than partially and 
fully automated systems.  Though in principle more advanced dispatching systems 
should lead to larger shifts in firm asset ownership, in this paper, we do not attempt to 
distinguish between the effects of different computerized dispatching systems due to 
limitations in the data.
2   
Historically, some firms were organized around relatively sophisticated radio-
based dispatching systems, while other firms often had rudimentary dispatching 
systems, sometimes as basic as hand-written notes on bulletin boards.  Firms with more 
advanced dispatching systems usually owned most or all of their own taxicabs and used 
their dispatching capabilities to support a network of inexperienced shift drivers—
typically non-owner drivers—while firms with simple, low-cost, dispatching systems 
catered to experienced owner-operators who managed their own block of business but 
banded together, often as cooperatives or associations, to share maintenance and 
administrative costs.   
Taxicab drivers’ incentive contracts do not vary with asset ownership—drivers 
are almost always full residual claimants even if they do not own the taxicab they drive 
(Schaller and Gilbert 1995).  However, capability is correlated with asset ownership.  In 
the absence of computerized dispatching, experienced drivers are far more productive 
than inexperienced drivers because they have developed a deep understanding of 
                                                 
1 Estimates of the cost of partially automated systems vary widely based on the exact functionality of the 
system, but the basic system is probably about half the cost a fully automated systems.  
2 In our data, most computerized dispatching systems were described as “partially automated” or “fully 
automated,” but, in our field research, we found that there was no general standard for distinguishing 
between “partially” and “fully” automated systems.  By contrast, there was broad agreement on what 
constituted a GPS-based system.  However, only about 20% computerized dispatching systems were 
characterized as GPS-based systems, and most had been adopted very close to the end of the testing period, 
which limited our ability to evaluate the impact of GPS-based systems on changes in asset ownership 
(Transit Cooperative Research Program Report, 1998). 
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demand patterns in their markets.
  3  While inexperienced drivers tend to inefficiently 
chase rides, experienced drivers know where to go and importantly when to wait for 
rides to materialize without wasting time and gasoline driving across town.
4  Relative to 
radio dispatching, computerized dispatching levels the playing field by more efficiently 
allocating vehicles to rides.
5  Inexperienced drivers enter pre-assigned high-volume 
zones and wait in an orderly (virtual) queue until they are assigned a ride, leading to 
significantly improved utilization at lower cost.  On the other hand, computerized 
dispatching is much less valuable for experienced drivers because they do not depend 
on an efficient queuing system to operate at close to full capacity—they already know 
where to go to find rides.  Thus, the benefits of computerized dispatching are 
disproportionately gained by inexperienced drivers.   
In addition to non-owner drivers and owner-operators who contract with firms for 
shared services, there is a third type of driver:  independent owner-operators, typically 
very experienced drivers who choose to operate without any firm affiliation or support.  
Driving independently represents owner-operators’ outside option when they contract 
with fleets, as owner-operators are free to switch between being independent and 
working for firms.  We do not explicitly consider how independent owner-operators are 
affected by firm adoption of new dispatching technology.  Implicit in our theory is the idea 
that independent owner-operators do not benefit from contracting with taxicab firms for 
dispatching services ex ante because their high levels of industry-specific knowledge 
allows them to achieve maximum productivity without contracting for dispatching.  Given 
the maintained assumption that IT is a substitute for industry-specific knowledge, the 
direct effect of IT adoption would never lead independent owner-operators to contract 
with the firm for dispatching services as an owner-operator.  A more dynamic model 
might explicitly incorporate the asset ownership decisions of independent owner-
operators who choose to contract with firms after IT adoption, and, indeed, many 
                                                 
3 The value of knowledge as a productivity shifter is particularly salient when tasks are non-routine.  Autor 
and Dorn (2009) report that taxicab drivers have the fourth least routine job of 354 Census occupations, as 
measured by the 2000 Census Routine Task Index, after “fire fighting, prevention and inspection” (#2) and 
ahead of” police, detectives and private investigators” (#6).  
4 Schaller and Gilbert (1995) report that the top quartile of New York City taxicab drivers earn 59% more 
than the bottom quartile.  Woollett, Spiers and Maguire (2009) show that experienced taxicab drivers in 
London develop a remarkably deep understanding of the spatial structure of the city. 
5 Gilbert, Nalevanko and Stone (1993) report that dispatch times fell by 50-60% following the adoption of 
computerized dispatching.  Our own estimates reveal that average fleet utilization increased by 15%-20%, 
following the adoption of computerized dispatching systems, though both results are estimated as treatment 
on the treated effects, not average treatment effects. 
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formerly independent drivers did contract with firms during our sample period.
6  
However, independent owner-operators who become agent-owners can be treated 
analogously to agent-owners in our simple model, so modeling the additional dynamics 
adds little insight to the theory articulated herein.   
Importantly for this study, unique local regulatory, competitive and geographic 
factors can influence the costs and benefits of computerized dispatching systems.  Most 
of these factors are exogenous to the choices taxicab fleet operators make, with respect 
to information technology adoption, providing the natural experiment missing from many 
studies of technology adoption.  Local regulations determine retail prices, fix the number 
of permits or medallions, devise a permit allocation system, limit the transferability of 
permits, set restrictions on the entry and exit of fleets and may require either fleets or 
individuals to own operating permits.  Differences between cities, such as regulated fare 
changes, may also influence the adoption of computerized dispatch systems by 
changing the benefits of adoption.  Moreover, the geography of a city can influence the 
distribution of rides between dispatched fares and curbside hails.  The paper exploits 
this natural variation in markets to control for the endogenous nature of the adoption 
decision. 
Since onboard computers installed in taxicabs are specific to the firm’s 
dispatching system, transaction cost economics asset specificity mechanism represents 
a leading alternative hypothesis to our theory of vertical integration in response to a 
capabilities shock.  The nature of asset specificity is often context dependent and subtle, 
which means that it must be considered carefully.
7  Since the onboard computers 
installed in taxicabs are specific to the firms dispatching system the asset specificity 
hypothesis certainly has face validity.  However, there are at least two compelling 
reasons to believe that contractual hazards are not severe with respect to contracting 
over the installation and use of onboard computers in the taxicab industry.  First, it is 
apparent in the data that many firms deploy onboard computers in owner-operator 
                                                 
6 The U.S. taxicab industry was buffeted by two major shocks during the mid-1990s.  The first, the subject 
of this paper, was technological as new computerized dispatching systems reached the taxicab market.  The 
second shock, a regulatory change that led to widespread diversification into limousines decreased vertical 
integration as formerly independent driver-owners increasingly contracted with firms (Rawley and Simcoe 
2009).  The net effect of the two shocks was a secular decline in vertical integration levels between 1992 
and 1997.  In this paper we investigate the effects of computerized dispatching on asset ownership, 
controlling the effect of diversification.   
 
7 See for example the role of reputational capital as a firm-specific asset in the trucking industry (Nickerson 
and Silverman 2003) 
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vehicles.  In the average firm that uses computerized dispatching, 31% of vehicles are 
owner-operator taxicabs (see Figure 1).
8  The fact that the practice of contracting 
through market exchange to deploy onboard computers in owner-operator vehicles is 
widespread indicates that such contracts are not particularly fraught with hazards.   
Bolstering this claim, industry interviews confirm that firms often recoup their investment 
costs by levying a surcharge on owner-operators for their use of the system.  Second, 
the highly regulated nature of the taxicab industry suggests that contracts are 
enforceable by regulators who typically have wide latitude to levy fines and penalize 
drivers and firms.  Assuming that firms acquire the onboard computers on behalf of 
owner-operators, as is customary in the industry, the key potential contracting hazard is 
that owner-operators would quit the firm taking the onboard computer with them.   
However, non-performance is directly observable, which suggests that it is unlikely to 
pose a significant contractual hazard.  While it seems possible and even likely that firm-
specific asset specificity influences the cross-sectional pattern of asset ownership in the 
industry, in addition to industry-specific asset specificity we describe in our theory, we 
shall control for time-invariant firm-specific effects in our empirical specification.   
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Data 
 
The core dataset from this paper comes from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census.  
The Economic Census began tracking taxicab firms in 1992 and has continued to track 
them every five years.  The Economic Census is a comprehensive dataset that includes 
every taxicab firm in the United States with at least one employee (SIC code 412100):  
3,184 in 1992 and 3,337 in 1997.  From this universe of taxicab firms, 787 firms are 
“substantial entities”—firms that have at least $10,000 of taxicab revenue and two 
taxicabs—that maintained operations during the full sample period between 1992 and 
1997.
9  Economic Census micro-data is extremely valuable because it includes the 
number of taxicabs by ownership type (e.g., fleet-owned versus driver-owned), allowing 
for an unusually precise measure of within-firm changes in vertical integration over time.  
                                                 
8 31% = 1 – 69% of non-owners (FOWN), represented in Figure 1 as the (1997) black bar for firms that 
adopted dispatching technology (TECH) between 1992 and 1997 
9 Approximately 2,000 observations in 1992 and 1997 are administrative record (AR) firms—very small 
firms, typically those with only one employee, that the Economic Census does not actually survey but 
rather imputes values for. 
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The Economic Census does not, however, contain information on dispatching 
technology.
 10
To capture dispatching system data, we augmented the 1998 Transit 
Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) survey
  11 with our own survey of all taxicab 
operators in the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) business register with taxicab SIC code 
412100 and at least two employees.
12  We merged the resulting 635 (363 TCRP 
observations and 272 author survey observations) observations with the 3,153 
observations in the 1997 Economic Census by zip code or county code.  The merging 
process generated 409 unique matched observations, 197 from the TCRP survey and 
212 from the authors’ survey.
13  Of the 409 matched observations, 244 operated 
continuously between 1992 and 1997 and reported valid data in both years to the 
Economic Census, representing 31% of all substantial entities.   
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the firms in our test sample and for all firms 
that meet our sampling criteria in 1992 or 1997, including firms that entered or exited the 
industry between 1992 and 1997.  36% of the taxicab firms in the test sample adopted 
computerized dispatching between 1992 and 1997 (87 firms).  The average firm in our 
sample had 52 taxicabs, 89% of which were owned, in 1992, compared to an average 
fleet size of 19 taxicabs (20,014 taxicabs / 1,020 fleets) with 82% owned (16,426 
taxicabs owned / 20,014 taxicabs total) in the full set of substantial entities in the 
Economic Census.  In 1997, the average firm in our sample had 67 taxicabs in their 
fleet, 65% of which were owned, compared to an average fleet size of 27 taxicabs 
                                                 
10 In addition to the quantitative data described in this section, we conducted 73 semi-structured interviews 
with city taxicab regulators, fleet owners and mobile information technology network technology vendors 
and taxicab drivers.  These interviews provided a wealth of insights and anecdotes that greatly improved 
this paper.  For so freely sharing with us the wealth of knowledge they have accumulated regarding the 
U.S. taxicab industry, we are particularly indebted to C.J. Christina, Jason Diaz, Thomas Drischler, Stan 
Faulwetter, Alfred La Gasse, John Hamilton, Marco Henry, Kimberly Lewis, Joe Morra, John Perry, David 
Reno, Aubby Sherman, Doug Summers and, especially, Craig Leisy.   
11 We are grateful to Tom Cook and Gorman Gilbert for generously sharing the detailed responses to the 
TCRP survey with us. 
12 There were 1,929 taxicab operators in the D&B business register.  391 surveys were returned 
undeliverable and 403 firms responded with complete questionnaires (26%) response rate.  We verified that 
late respondents were not statistically different from early respondents as a check on non-response bias.  
272 of the firms in our survey were both different from those that responded to the TCRP survey and began 
operations before 1997.    
13 The 226 unmatched observations were primarily small firms.  Small firms are more difficult to match by 
zip code or county code because there are often many small firms in the same area.  A disproportionate 
number of TCRP respondents could not be matched because the TCRP data only contains county-level 
geographic information, whereas the authors’ survey also includes zip code.   
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(29,960 taxicabs / 1,106 fleets), 61% of which were owned (18,303 taxicabs owned / 
29,960 taxicabs total).   
The test sample contains accounts for fully 63% (52 taxicabs/firm in the test 
sample x 244 firms in the test sample / 20,144 total taxicabs in firms in the Economic 
Census) and 55% (67 x 244/ 29,960) of all taxicabs in fleets in 1992 and 1997, 
respectively.  While our test sample captures a significant proportion of the substantial 
entities in the industry, larger firms are clearly oversampled.  Because we are interested 
in estimating the effect of dispatching technology adoption on the set of firms at risk to 
adopt, not necessarily the population treatment effect of computerized dispatching 
adoption all taxicab firms, it is most interesting to analyze a set consisting primarily of 
larger substantial entities.  Therefore, for our research question, an oversample of the 
largest firms is actually preferable to a representative sample of all taxicab firms, though 
the burden remains on us to show that non-response bias is not driving our results, 
which we do in the robustness checks below. 
Table 2 shows the size distribution of firms in the test sample in 1992, and the 
percentage of firms that adopted computerized dispatching (for the first time) by 1997, 
according to the firm’s1992 size category.  As expected, the smallest firms, those with 
exactly two taxicabs, never adopt computerized dispatching technology, while 70% of 
fleets with over fifty or more taxicabs in 1992 adopted computerized dispatching systems 
by 1997.  The rate for the largest size category is approximately three times the rate of 
firms with less than 25 taxicabs (23% adoption rate), which supports our contention that 
large firms are more likely to adopt computerized dispatching systems and underscores 
the importance of estimating the average treatment effect as opposed to the population 
average treatment effect.   
 
4.2 Empirical Specification 
Figure 1 illustrates the secular decline in vertical integration and previews our main 
result, showing vertical integration levels in 1992 and 1997 for our treatment group, firms 
that adopted computerized dispatching systems, and our control group, firms that did not 
adopt computerized dispatching systems.  In 1992, the 87 firms that subsequently 
adopted computerized dispatching systems owned 91% of their vehicles, while the 157 
firms that did not adopt computerized dispatching systems by 1997 owned 86% of their 
vehicles.  By 1997, after the secular decline in levels of vertical integration, firms that 
adopted computerized dispatching systems owned 69% of their vehicles, a decrease in 
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the level of vertical integration of 17%, while firms that did not adopt computerized 
dispatching systems owned 62% of their vehicles, a decrease of 29%.  Thus, net of the 
secular decline in vertical integration levels, firms that adopted computerized dispatching 
systems increased their level of vertical integration by 12% relative to firms that did not 
adopt.  In the statistical tests that follow, we show that the relationship between the 
adoption of computerized dispatching and asset ownership changes apparent in the raw 
data approximates the average treatment effect of interest.   
To measure the impact of adoption of mobile information technology on changes 
in vertical integration, we use the change in the fraction of vehicles owned by the fleet 
(ΔFOWN), which is continuous and bounded between negative one and one, and a 
binary explanatory variable ΔTECH that is equal to one when the firm adopts a mobile 
information technology network and zero otherwise, as in OLS equation (1): 
  
(1) ΔFOWNi = α + BTΔTECHi + Xc,iBBc + εi. 
 
Variables that could plausibly shift, directly or indirectly, the boundary of the firm are in 
Xc,i including:  changes in firm size, measured by changes in the logged values of 
taxicab capital and the square of changes in the logged taxicab; changes in the degree 
to which taxicab firms are horizontally integrated measured by log limousine capital and 
log limousine capital squared; changes in the level of vertical integration in other fleets in 
the same market—to control for time varying market-level effects on changes in the 
firm’s own level of vertical integration; and changes in the number of taxicabs and 
limousines under management operated by competing fleets in the same market 
(county)—a proxy for the competitive dynamics of the firm’s operating environment.  
Taking firm-level first differences in model (1) is similar to using firm fixed effects 
when there are only two periods of observations and first differences are taken in all of 
variables, as (1) controls for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity.  The result is a 
specification that is equivalent to a firm and time fixed effects model, to within a 
constant, which controls for time-invariant firm characteristics as well as number of time-
varying firm and market characteristics, without biasing the estimated standard errors 
downward as fixed effects models do.  We take advantage of the first differences 
specification by clustering at the market (county) level as we do not need to cluster at 
the firm level to correct the standard errors.   
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In the ideal experiment, one would randomly assign computerized dispatching to 
firms and observe how their asset ownership patterns changed relative to firms who 
were not assigned the technology.  However, the decision to adopt computerized 
dispatching is an endogenous choice that may be influenced by unobserved time-
varying firm-specific factors that are also correlated with changes in asset ownership.  
Even OLS specifications that control for time-invariant firm characteristics and changes 
in firm size may not identify the impact of computerized dispatching on asset ownership 
because the benefits of computerized dispatching vary based on unobservable (to the 
econometrician) firm and market characteristics that may also be correlated with asset 
ownership decisions.   
On the one hand, the OLS results may be biased downward if firms adopt 
computerized dispatching when ex ante they contract with less knowledgeable (or 
capable) drivers, since less knowledgeable drivers benefit more from computerized 
dispatching.  We control directly for driver ownership of taxicabs, which is probably the 
most important single determinant of driver knowledge, but there are potentially other, 
unobservable, factors that influence the distribution of driver capabilities across firms.  
Thus, adopters may be precisely the firms that have less reason to vertically integrate 
further following adoption.
   Similarly, selection effects that drive firms with strong ex ante 
relationships with owner-operators to adopt computerized dispatching leads to 
downward biased estimates of the impact of computerized dispatching on asset 
ownership since stronger relationships with owner-operators facilitate implementation of 
the dispatching system.  On the other hand, one might worry that reverse causality 
effects could bias the OLS results upward, if, for example, firms were more likely to 
adopt computerized dispatching when they faced difficulties attracting independent 
owner-operators historically and sought to induce these drivers to contract with the firm 
by offering additional services.  We address the potential for endogeneity in the 
technology adoption decision using a propensity score matching techniques to control 
for observable differences between firms and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variables (IV) approach to control for unobservable differences between 
firms.   
Our propensity score matching technique follows Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
who show that in the absence of unobservable characteristics that are correlated with 
both the dependent and explanatory variables, matching treatment and control groups 
on all relevant observable characteristics creates a valid counterfactual against which to 
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measure treatment effects.  As in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we calculate the 
propensity score of the probability of adopting computerized dispatching systems, using 
the latent variable (y*), which predicts whether the firm selects a binary treatment y 
(y=mobile information technology network adoption):  
 
(2) yi* = xiβ + ei,  
 
where we observe y = 1 [y*>0] when the firm adopts computerized dispatching systems 
between 1992 and 1997; x includes all observable characteristics of firms in 1992 that 
might plausibly have an effect on the adoption decision and e is an error term, which is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance one in a probit 
specification.  We then drop firms off the common support of the propensity score 
distribution of the probability of adopting computerized dispatching systems and weigh 
included firms by the inverse probability of being treated to create a balanced sample of 
treated and control observations (Imbens 2004).    
Table 3 shows the variables included in the vector x in (2), their coefficients from 
the probit predicting adoption of computerized dispatching systems (first column) and the 
marginal effects of x at the average value of each regressor on the firms propensity to 
diversify (second column).  Following the standard propensity score matching approach, 
our model is complete with highly correlated regressors and interactions between terms 
that capture marginal effects that might be expected to influence computerized adoption 
decisions.  A more parsimonious version of the matching model that only controls for the 
main effects of the variables of interest generated similar “second stage” (e.g., matched) 
outcomes, though with lower explanatory power in the first stage.   
As expected, the most important single factor influencing adoption was the (log) 
number of taxicabs in the firm in 1992 (see Table 3).  In an attempt to capture the 
marginal effect of lagged firm size on market and firm characteristics that might influence 
adoption decisions, log number of taxicabs in the firm in 1992 also enters the matching 
equation as an interaction with urban,  total factor productivity (TFP) and corporate, 
though these effects are not statistically significant.  The smaller in magnitude, though 
still large and statistically significant, negative effect of log taxicab capital on the 
adoption of computerized dispatching reflects the fact that number of taxicabs, which is 
highly correlated with log taxicab capital (correlation coefficient = 0.83), is the key driver 
of adoption of computerized dispatching not the composition of taxicabs between driver-
    
 
16
owned and fleet-owned.  Consistent with the rationale for using average fleet size of 
other firms in the same market as an instrument, lagged other firms’ size (avg. taxicabs 
market–i) has a positive and statistically significant effect on the propensity to adopt 
computerized dispatching systems even when controlling for the firm’s own size.   
Table 3 also shows a comparison of means for control and treatment groups 
before after matching.  Matching reduces, but does not eliminate, the lagged firm and 
market size differences between the two populations.  Since our main concern is that 
initial size differences between the two populations may influence subsequent adoption 
decisions in ways that are difficult to control for in our OLS model, the resulting match is 
a step in the right direction, but not a definitive control for endogeneity.  Our main 
identification strategy must, therefore, rely on our instrumental variables approach, 
though we proceed with the matched results as a robustness check. 
One of the advantages of studying the taxicab industry is that it is comprised of 
hundreds of distinct independent local markets.  Our sample of 244 firms covers 173 
markets (counties).  We exploit market level variation to address the potential for 
unobservable characteristics of firms to bias our results using lagged (e.g., 1992) 
average fleet size of other firms in the same market (AVGTAXIS), as well as the (logged) 
components of market population density, population (POP) and land area (MILES
2), as 
instruments for adoption.   
Lagged size of other fleets in the same market, AVGTAXIS, should not cause 
firms to adopt a computerized dispatching system or cause changes in firm asset 
ownership, particularly when controlling for the firm’s time invariant characteristics as 
well as the change in the firm’s own size.  However, lagged average size of other fleets 
in the same market may be correlated with a firm’s adoption of a computerized 
dispatching system to the extent that the firm is operating in a market where supply and 
demand, or regulatory characteristics of the market, tend to exogenously increase the 
average size of firms, and, therefore, create conditions under which firms have a higher 
demand for coordination technologies.  One might also expect that inter-firm awareness 
of new computerized dispatching technology increases when a firm operates in a market 
where other firms adopt computerized dispatching.  Therefore, the instrument lagged 
average size of other firms in the same market, AVGTAXIS, should be correlated with 
the adoption of computerized dispatching, ΔTECH, yet the instrument also satisfies the 
exclusion restriction, meaning that its effect on changes in the extent to which firms are 
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vertically integrated only operates through its correlation with the adoption of 
computerized dispatching systems.   
Because firms in our sample chose where to operate and made their initial asset 
ownership decisions before the existence of computerized dispatching, the components 
of population density, POP and MILES
2, are also exogenous to the decision to adopt 
computerized dispatching, ΔTECH, and to changes in asset ownership, ΔFOWN.  
However, increasing population density can reasonably be expected to lead to increased 
adoption of computerized dispatching technology because the complexity of taxicab 
operations tends to increase in urban markets where optimally matching vehicles to 
rides is contingent on where and when other rides terminate.  Because computerized 
dispatching helps manage system complexity, population density should generate a 
powerful first stage estimate of a firm’s likelihood to adopt computerized dispatching 
systems, yet POP and MILES
2are also valid instruments that should only influence 
changes in vertical integration through their correlation with ΔTECH.  Therefore, we 
specify the first stage of our 2SLS model as using model (3), which predicts the decision 
to adopt computerized dispatching, ΔTECH,  based on the three instruments 
AVGTAXIS, POP, and MILES
2
 along with the controls Xc from the OLS regression 
model (1). 
 
(3): ΔTECHi = a + Γ1AVGTAXISi+ Γ2POPi+ Γ3MILES
2
i + Xc,iBBc + ei. 
 
  In the second stage of the 2SLS model, the fitted values from (3), ΔTECH-
HAT, replace the endogenous regressor ΔTECH, to generate a prediction of the 
impact of technology adoption on fleet asset ownership that can be interpreted as 
causal as in (4).   
 
(4): ΔFOWNi = α + βΔTECH-HATi + Xc,iBBc + εi. 
 
Our instruments rely on market-level variation as we could not identify 
exogenous variables that might generate fleet-level variation in the incentive to adopt 
computerized dispatching systems that also satisfied the exclusion restriction for a valid 
instrument. Thus, our identification strategy is vulnerable to omitted variables that are 
correlated with both our market-level instruments and changes in asset ownership at the 
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firm level.  In particular, one may be concerned that independent owner-operators are 
more likely to contract with fleets in markets where AVGTAXIS is larger.  If our firm and 
market controls do not capture heterogeneous firm-level effects in the behavior of 
independent owner operators that are correlated with AVGTAXIS, the exclusion 
restriction would be violated and the instrument would be invalid.  However, given that 
the specification controls directly for time invariant firm-specific factors and time varying 
firm and market factors that are expected to influence shifts in the independent owner 
operator population’s contracting behavior, we view the risks of omitted variable bias in 
the 2SLS set-up to be limited.  Moreover, because the 244 fleets in our panel operate in 
174 different local markets, we are not concerned that the instrument will fail to generate 
sufficient variation in the first stage.   
 
5. Results 
The central tests of the hypothesis are within-firm regressions on changes in the 
boundary of the firm, following the adoption of computerized dispatching systems.  Table 
4 shows the results of tests on the survey respondent set with no controls.  The OLS 
(column 1) model demonstrates a strong unconditional correlation between adoption and 
increases in vertical integration as the fraction of vehicles that are fleet-owned, 
compared to driver-owned, increased by 12% in firms that adopted computerized 
dispatching systems compared to those that did not adopt.  Propensity score matched 
and weighted results (column 2) that control for observable differences between firms 
are statistically indistinguishable from the unmatched OLS estimates. 
While OLS and propensity score matched estimates are approximately equal to 
the raw difference in the change in means between adopters and non-adopters, point 
estimates of the adoption of computerized dispatching on asset ownership are larger 
when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the adoption decision.  With an F-
statistic of 8.2, the correct signs on the instruments and statistically significant t-statistics 
on two of the three instruments in the first stage of the 2SLS model (column 3) the 
instruments are strong, while the second stage of the 2SLS procedure generates a point 
estimate that is more than three times larger than the estimates in columns 1 and 2.  
Although the second stage estimate on adoption is much noisier from the OLS and 
propensity score matched estimates, the differences in the point estimates are 
marginally statistically significant at the 10% level.  The interpretation of the 2SLS result 
is that if IT adoption were randomly assigned, the impact of ΔTECH  on firm asset 
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ownership would be larger than at firms that do (endogenously) adopt the technology.  If 
the 2SLS inference is valid, the endogenous adoption of computerized dispatching 
biases the true impact of adoption on asset ownership toward zero.   
The noisier point estimates generated by the 2SLS model might reflect the fact 
that the instruments vary at the market, but not the firm level, and, therefore, fail to pick 
up within-market variation in the computerized dispatching adoption decision, but could 
also imply that the 2SLS results are misestimated due to some important time-varying 
source of heterogeneity outside the model that is correlated with the instruments and 
asset ownership.  To test the robustness of the empirical model, and, particularly, the 
validity of the 2SLS results, to specification we include additional controls in Table 5.   
Table 5 includes firm and market-level controls that may influence changes in 
asset ownership.  Several controls do appear to influence changes in vertical integration.  
As in Rawley and Simcoe (2009), we find that increasing diversification into limousines 
(Δlog limousine capital) leads to decreased vertical integration because firms replace 
non-owner taxicab drivers with more professional owner-operators to manage 
diseconomies of scope.  Also, when firms grow their taxicab business quickly (Δlog 
taxicab capital 
2), they rely more heavily on attracting owner-operators, which leads to 
lower levels of firm ownership of taxicabs.  While the inclusion of a number of controls 
explains a much larger proportion of the variance of changes in asset ownership (the R
2 
jumps from 0.03 to 0.20 in the OLS specification), the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the results are nearly identical with controls as in the specifications 
without controls.  The stability of the estimates on computerized technology adoption 
suggests that the effect is robust and that omitted variables bias is probably not severe 
in this context.  
With controls, the 2SLS estimate of the impact of information technology on 
asset ownership is large and statistically significant, but the difference between the 2SLS 
and OLS point estimates ceases to be statistically significant.  Unfortunately, we cannot 
be certain whether the lack of statistical significance on the difference in the coefficients 
is a result of effectively controlling for sources of firm-specific heterogeneity in our OLS 
specification, or if the result is being driven by the noise in the 2SLS estimate.  The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the necessity of the instruments, in the presence of the full 
set of controls, was equivocal as it did not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are 
necessary only at the 10% level.  A more pressing concern is that an F-statistic of 4.0 in 
first stage may indicate that the second stage results are being spuriously generated by 
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the many weak instruments problem.  To verify that the 2SLS results are not being 
driven by the many weak instruments problem, we re-estimated the 2SLS models using 
only our main instrument—lagged average size of other firms in the same market—and 
found the magnitude of the 2SLS estimates to be even larger (though noisier) and still 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  We also tested for overidentification using 
Sargan’s J-test and found that the J-statistic was significant at the 1% level.  Overall the 
diagnostic tests on the instruments suggest that our instruments are valid and our 
identification strategy sound, though we cannot be certain that the OLS results are 
biased downward due to endogeneity.
 
We use two robustness checks to verify that our results are not being driven by 
non-response bias.  First, since non-respondent (“unmatched”) firms are smaller on 
average than firms in our test sample and the average adoption rate in the sample is 
36%, most of the missing technology adoption data appears to be from firms that have 
not adopted computerized dispatching.  Therefore, we treat all unmatched firms as non-
adopters and re-run all of the OLS regressions, including these firms along with a 
dummy variable for unmatched firms.  We find that the robustness check generates 
nearly identical estimates of the impact of adoption of computerized dispatching systems 
on asset ownership, suggesting that the effect of excluding the unmatched firms from 
our main analysis does not bias the results.  Second, we re-run the tests, excluding 
small firms, with and without the unmatched firms using different definitions of small 
(e.g., more than 5 taxicabs, 10 taxicabs, 20 taxicabs) and find similar (though 
progressively nosier) results as with the larger set.  We conclude that our results are not 
driven by non-response bias. 
Taken together, the results show that the adoption of computerized dispatching 
leads to a 12% increase in fleet ownership of taxicabs.
 14  The robust evidence supports 
the core hypothesis of the paper that the adoption of information technology leads to an 
increase in firm asset ownership when centralized information provided by information 
technology is a substitute for agents’ industry-specific knowledge.   
 
                                                 
14 As an additional robustness check, we ran all of our OLS models using a Tobit specification to account 
for the potential truncation of the dependent variable (at minus one and one).  Perhaps because only twenty-
two observations (10% of the sample) are truncated, fifteen left censored and seven right censored, all of 
the results are qualitatively identical in the Tobit specification.  Results are available from the authors upon 
request. 




This paper integrates insights from the literature on capabilities with the fundamental 
predictions of organizational economics to show how information technology influences 
asset ownership decisions.  Consistent with the standard predictions of organizational 
economics, we assume asset-owners make investments in industry-specific human 
capital to increase the efficiency of their assets that are tantamount to skills or 
capabilities.  We build on the assumption that asset-owners possess greater capabilities 
ex ante to propose that when managerial direction is a substitute for agents’ industry-
specific knowledge, information technology that reduces the costs of communicating 
information from the corporate center leads to increased firm asset ownership.  Thus, 
firm IT capabilities crowd out agent knowledge-based capabilities, and the resulting de-
skilling effect shifts ownership of assets toward firms. 
We test this proposition in the context of the adoption of computerized 
dispatching systems in taxicab firms.  Our main result shows that when taxicab firms 
adopt computerized dispatching systems, they shift toward owning 12% more of the 
vehicles in their fleet.  The evidence supports the contention that information technology 
adoption leads to increased firm ownership of assets when the provision of centralized 
information is a substitute for agents’ industry-specific knowledge.   
  This research has implications for research and practice alike.  For organizational 
scholars, this paper provides a simple framework for integrating organizational 
economics and organizational capabilities, by analyzing how the substitutability of firm 
and agent capabilities influences the boundary of the firm.  For managers, this research 
suggests that information technology adoption and vertical integration strategies should 
be jointly determined when IT impacts agents’ performance heterogeneously. 
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Figure 1 Extent of vertical integration for mobile information technology adopters 
and non-adopters before and after adoption 
 
TECH 1997 (black bar) refers to firms that adopt mobile information technology between 1992 
and 1997 (n=83 in both years), while No TECH 1997 (light bar) refers to firms that do not adopt 
computerized dispatching systems between 1992 and 1997 (n=161 in both years).  Overall n=244 
in both years. 
 
 


































The test sample includes firms that responded to at least one of the taxicab technology surveys 
(TCRP or author), could be matched to the Economic Census and meets all of the following 
sampling criteria:  SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab revenue ≥ $10K, and at least 2 
taxicabs in both 1992 and 1997. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
n=244  1992 1997
  Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Adoption of computerized 
dispatching 
0.02 0.17 0.36 0.48 
Fleet-owned taxicabs (share)  0.89 0.30 0.66 0.39 
Total taxicabs  52 112 67 131 
Fleet-owned taxicabs  46 110 45 112 
Driver-owned taxicabs  6 29 22 72 
Taxicab capital ($000)  546 1,321 864 1,887 
Total limousines  0 0 7 17 
Limousine capital ($000)  7 52 74 189 
Taxicab revenue (000)  1,283 2,808 1,640 3,954 
Corporation  0.84 0.38 0.84 0.39 
Market fleet-owned taxicabs-i  
(share) 
0.63 0.33 0.36 0.23 
Taxicabs in the market  171 391 328 508 
Limousines in the market  44 112 113 242 
County population (000)  730 1,079 814 1,170 
County square miles  1,018 1,455 1,038 1,594 
All firms
Taxicab revenue ($M) 
Number of taxicabs 
Number of fleet-owned taxicabs 











The test sample includes firms that responded to at least one of the taxicab technology surveys 
(TCRP or author), could be matched to the Economic Census and meets all of the following 
sampling criteria:  SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab revenue ≥ $10K, and at least 2 
taxicabs in both 1992 and 1997. 
 “All firms” includes firms that meet the sampling criteria in at least one year (1992 or 1997). 








Table 2 Size distribution of firms and dispatching technology adoption in the test 
sample 
 
1992 fleet size 
Number of firms by 
1992 size category 
(count) 
Average size by 
firm by 1992 size 
category (taxicabs 
per firm) 
Percentage of firms 
adopting TECH 
1992-1997 
2 taxicabs  8  2  0% 
3-4 taxicabs  32  4  19% 
5-9 taxicabs  48  8  15% 
10-24 taxicabs  59  16  25% 
25-49 taxicabs  40  36  38% 
≥ 50 taxicabs  57  164  70% 
Total  244  52  34% 
The test sample includes firms that responded to at least one of the taxicab technology surveys 
(TCRP or author), could be matched to the Economic Census and meets all of the following 
sampling criteria:  SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab revenue ≥ $10K, and at least 2 
taxicabs in both 1992 and 1997. 
 




Table 3 Selection equation predicting adoption of computerized dispatching 
systems 
 
  Probit output  Means before and after matching 
   ∂y/∂u No t-stat No   t-stat
 Coef.  at  ū TECH TECH on  Δ TECH TECH  on  Δ
Total factor   -0.30  0.02    0.05 0.10 -0.5 0.04 0.10  -0.6
productivity (0.32 (0.03   (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Log total  1.26  0.15  * 2.17 3.29 -5.6 2.24 3.29  -5.0
taxicabs (0.36 (0.06   (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.22) 
Log taxicab  -0.64  -0.07  * 4.23 5.39 -3.7 4.32 5.39  -3.3
capital (0.21 (0.05   (0.17) (0.29) (0.18) (0.29) 
Fleet owned  0.64  0.64    0.91 0.86 1.3 0.91 0.86  1.4
taxicabs (share)  (0.40 (0.40   (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Log total   -0.11  -0.27    2.77 3.30 -1.7 2.76 3.30  -1.7
taxicabs market  (0.07 (0.15  (0.18) (0.26) (0.19) (0.26) 
Log total   0.04  0.02    1.98 2.35 -1.5 2.05 2.35  -1.1
limousines mrkt.- (0.09 (0.02  (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
Corporation -0.26  -0.08    0.81 0.88 -1.3 0.82 0.88  -1.2
indicator (0.45 (0.06   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Log county  0.12  0.04    12.67 13.01 -2.0 12.71 13.01  -1.7
population (0.14 (0.02   (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) 
Log county   -0.12  -0.04    6.34 6.12 1.3 6.33 6.12 1.1
miles
2 (0.10 (0.02  (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) 
Urban   0.16  0.16    0.11 0.18 -1.5 0.11 0.18  -1.4
indicator (0.53 (0.53   (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Avg. taxicabs  0.01  0.04  * 11.75 28.46 -4.4 11.08 28.46 -4.4
per firm market -i (0.00 (0.02  (1.47) (4.50) (1.44) (4.50) 
Urban x log  -0.15  -0.02    0.24 0.70 -2.7 0.27 0.70  -2.4
total taxicabs  (0.14 (0.02   (0.07) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) 
TFP x log  0.10  0.03    0.48 0.98 -1.6 0.45 0.98  -1.6
total taxicabs  (0.10 (0.03   (0.17) (0.29) (0.18) (0.29) 
Corp x log  0.02  0.02    1.84 3.01 -5.2 1.94 3.01  -4.6
total taxicabs  (0.17 (0.02   (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) 
Constant     Y               
Pseudo R
2 0.21            
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N 244  161 83 140 83 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 4 Adoption of coordination technology and asset ownership:  no controls 
 
Dep. variable = Change in the % of vehicles in the fleet owned by the firm 
(ΔFOWN) 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS Matched 2SLS 
        
Adoption of computerized  0.13 **  0.13 **  0.48  ** 
dispatching (TECH)  (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.19)   
          
Constant  -0.29 ***  -0.41 ***  -0.40  *** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
    
R
2 / Psuedo-R
2 0.03 0.02   n/a 
N  244 223   244 
      
2SLS 1
st stage summary statistics     
F-statistic    8.2 
  4.1 
  2.2 
t-statistic on avg. taxicabs/fleet in the market –i 
t-statistic on log market population 
t-statistic on log market size (miles
2)     -1.0 
Adjusted R
2   0.08 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level. 
The test sample includes firms that responded to at least one of the taxicab technology surveys 
(TCRP or author), could be matched to the Economic Census and meets all of the following 
sampling criteria:  SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab revenue ≥ $10K, and at least 2 
taxicabs in both 1992 and 1997. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 Adoption of coordination technology and asset ownership:  controls 
 
Dep. variable = Change in the % of vehicles in the fleet owned by the firm 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS Matched 2SLS 
Adoption of computerized   0.12 **  0.13 **  0.45  ** 
dispatching (TECH)  (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.22)   
Δlog taxicab capital  0.05   0.04   0.06   
     (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   
Δlog taxicab capital
2 -0.01 *  -0.01   -0.02  * 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
ΔFleet-owned taxicabs  0.04   -0.04   -0.00   
market-i (%)  (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.08)   
Δlog(taxicabs in the market-i)  0.01   0.01   0.02   
    (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Δlog(limousines in the market-i)  0.02   0.03   0.03   
  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   
        
Δlog limousine capital  -0.04 **  -0.04 **  -0.02   
  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Δlog limousine capital
2 -0.01 *  -0.01 *  -0.01  ** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Δlog county population   0.02 **  0.02 **  0.03  *** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Constant  -0.14 ***  -0.15 ***  -0.27  *** 
  (0.05)   0.05 (0.10) 
R
2 /Psuedo-R
2 0.20 0.20 n/a 
N  244 223 244 
2SLS 1
st stage summary statistics  
F-statistic  4.0 
3.5 
2.4 
t-statistic on avg. taxicabs/fleet in the 
market –i  
t-statistic on log market population 





Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level. 
The test sample includes firms that responded to at least one of the taxicab technology surveys 
(TCRP or author), could be matched to the Economic Census and meets all of the following 
sampling criteria:  SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab revenue ≥ $10K, and at least 2 
taxicabs in both 1992 and 1997. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 




Appendix:  When does technology adoption lead to changes in asset ownership? 
 
This appendix uses a simple model to show how technology adoption influences asset 
ownership when agents have industry-specific human capital. We assume that an 
agent’s utility (U) depends on output (V), a cost paid to the firm (C) for the right to 
generate V using the firm’s assets and technology resources, and disutility of effort (t): 
 
U = V – C – t. 
 
We further assume that output depends on asset ownership and (firm) technology 
adoption: V = V(FOWN, TECH).  Asset ownership is measured by an indicator FOWN, 
which equals one the asset is owned by the firm, and zero otherwise.  Information 
technology adoption is represented by the indicator variable TECH. 
 
Costs are also determined by asset ownership and agent productivity: C = C(FOWN, V). 
We assume that non-owners have no bargaining power, so firms set a rental fee that 
keeps them at their reservation utility, which we normalize to zero: 
 
C(1, V) = V – t. 
 
Owner-agents have an outside option—working independently—which is worth x. 
Because of their ability to work independently, these agents will only remit some fraction 
α of their output to the firm: 
 
C(0, V) = α[V – x]. 
  
Finally, we assume that firms stand ready to buy assets from owner-agents at a price 
that depends on the bargaining parameter Γ, 0 < Γ < 1, and the difference in their 
earnings from contracting with asset owners relative to non-owners:  
 
P = Γ[C(1, V(1,TECH)) – C(0,V(0,TECH))]. 
 
 
We now ask when technology adoption will lead to increased fleet ownership, focusing 
on the case where some agents made specific investments in industry-specific human 
capital in the pre-period.   
 
First, consider an agent who has made an industry-specific investment in knowledge 
before the new technology arrives. The agent will prefer to own their asset if and only if: 
 
U = V(0,0) – C(0,V(0,0)) – t > Γ[C(1, V(1,0)) – C(0,V(0,0))] = P  .  (A1) 
 
Once the new technology arrives, an agent-owner will sell their asset to a firm when: 
 
U = V(0,1) – C(0,V(0,1)) – t < Γ[C(1, V(1,1)) – C(0,V(0,1))] = P  .  (A2) 
 
Subtracting (A2) from (A1), and substituting for C yields  
 
(1 – α + Γα)[V(0,0) – V(0,1)] > Γ[V(1,0) – V(1,1)]. 
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To interpret this condition in terms of capabilities, note that it is equivalent to  
 
 [V(1,1) – V(1,0)] / [V(0,1) – V(0,0)] > (1 – α + αΓ)/ Γ.  (A3) 
 
The right side of (A3) depends only on the parties’ relative bargaining power, and is 
always greater than or equal to one. In general, one can interpret this quantity as a 
threshold that captures the extent to which TECH must substitute for agent-owners’ 
industry-specific knowledge before agent-owners will sell their assets to firms. 
 
The left side of (A3) is greater than 1 if and only if FOWN and TECH are complements in 
the non-owners total output function V relative to any positive benefits owner-agents 
might receive from TECH. One can interpret this complementarity between technology 
adoption and non-owner agents in terms of capabilities. By increasing the firm’s 
communication ability, technology adoption yields greater benefits to non-owners, who 
rely on centralized information to increase their output; while TECH reduces the relative 
value of agent-owners industry-specific knowledge.  The result shows that given a 
productivity shock from information technology adoption that is “large enough” for non-





                                                 
15 Taken literally, (A3) suggests that if all owner-agents would make the same asset ownership decision 
once the firm adopts TECH. However, one might add a driver specific perturbation to the cost function to 
produce smooth changes in the probability of fleet ownership following technology adoption.  
   